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ARTICLES 4 AND 8 OF THE
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
Norman Penney*
BANK-CUSTOMER RELATIONSHIP
Article 4 of the Uniform Commercial Code represents a cul-
mination of extensive efforts to achieve uniformity in the law
governing bank deposits and collections. It is divided into two
segments, one governing bank collections and the other the re-
lationship between banks and their customers.
I do not plan to discuss that portion of the article which
deals with bank collections. I will limit my discussion to part 4
dealing with the bank-customer relationship. This subject mat-
ter is more controversial and more interesting; it is of concern
to a much broader segment of the legal profession whereas
the bank collection area has already received some attention
in Louisiana periodicals, including your own.
I would like to make two points before I begin:
(1) As distinct from many states considering Code adoption,
Louisiana already has statutes impinging upon several of the
problems dealt with by the bank-customer relationship provi-
sions of article 4.1
(2) Although article 4 provides specifically for adaptation to
changes in banking practices, 2 it may well be that many of the
rules codified in this statute will be of little relevance in another
decade or two.
A. Overdrafts (4-401)
The Code permits a bank to charge properly payable checks
to its customer's account, even though the charge produces an
overdraft.3 There are no provisions in the Code governing the
propriety of permitting overdrafts and presumably the present
Louisiana statute making it a criminal offense for a bank offi-
*Professor of Law, Cornell University.
1. LA. R. S. 6:36, 42, 51, 52 (1950).
2. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-103(2) (3).
3. Id. § 4-401(1).
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cer to knowingly permit total unsecured overdrafts beyond ten
per cent of capital stock and declared surplus would be unaf-
fected. 4 The law of Louisiana 5 and most jurisdictions regards
the overdraft as analogous to a loan with an implied promise to
reimburse the bank.
B. Wrongful Dishonor (4-402)
Louisiana does not have a statute on the subject of wrongful
dishonor. The common law rule in Louisiana,6 permitting a mer-
chant or trader to recover substantial damages for the wrongful
dishonor of his check without the necessity of proving actual
damages, would be abandoned under the Code. Also abandoned
would be the award of nominal damages to non-traders where
only a technical breach is found.7 The Code, however, does add
a novel provision permitting recovery of damages for arrest or
prosecution resulting from wrongful dishonor.8
C. Stop Payment (4-403)
The provisions which have aroused the greatest amount of
controversy are those dealing with stop-payment orders. Lou-
isiana's statute limits the effectiveness of stop payment orders
to ninety days, with a right to renew from time to time in writ-
ing.9 Although the word "service" in the Louisiana statute may
lend support to the argument that only written stop orders
need be recognized, the later specific requirements for renewals
in writing argue more strongly for the recognition of oral stop
orders in the first instance. No Louisiana court has passed on
this question. The Code makes oral stop orders effective for
fourteen days.' 0 The order may be made effective for an addi-
tional period of six months by service of a written order within
the fourteen-day period. As with the present Louisiana statute,
the order may be extended indefinitely by additional writings,
but the Code's renewal period is six months rather than ninety
days."
4. LA. R. S. 6:51 (1950).
5. Caddo Trust & Savings Bank v. Bush, 182 So. 397 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1938).
6. Galloway v. Vivian State Bank, 168 La. 691, 123 So. 126 (1929).
7. Spearing v. Whitney-Central National Bank, 129 La. 607, 56 So. 548
(1911).
8. See PATON, DIGEST, Checks § 21. D:2 for collection of cases (Supp. 1963).
9. LA. R. S. 6:42 (1950).
10. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-403 (2).
11. Ibid.
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D. Subrogation (4-407)
Suppose I were to purchase a T.V. set, giving my check in
payment. If after I bring it home, it refuses to work, I might
be tempted to stop payment on the check. If I do properly stop
payment and the bank nevertheless, by inadvertence, pays the
check, most jurisdictions, before adoption of the Code, would
permit me to both keep the T.V. set and require the bank to
restore the funds paid on the stopped check to my account.12
This resulted from the court's strict view of the bank-customer
relationship and an almost universal refusal to apply the doc-
trine of subrogation to this fact pattern. Louisiana and New
Jersey alleviated the harshness of this rule by providing the in-
nocent though negligent bank with a statutory right of subro-
gation. 13 The Code follows this same pattern and at least in
this respect would provide no change in Louisiana law.
There are no Louisiana cases ruling on the propriety of ex-
culpation clauses in stop-payment orders. This has been a heated
battleground for bankers in many of the United States. The
great majority of jurisdictions, and all the recent cases have
ruled such clauses invalid either for violation of public policy or
lack of consideration.1 4 The Code codifies this widely followed
policy determination but leaves some leeway to bankers in per-
mitting them to fix "standards of care that are not manifestly
unreasonable."1" As I have suggested elsewhere, an imaginative
use of this opening wedge may permit the banks to cut their
stop-payment losses substantially.'6
E. Stale Checks (4-404)
Both the Louisiana Revised Statutes and the Uniform Com-
mercial Code have provisions dealing with stale checks.' 7 These
statutes seek to alleviate the plight of a bank when it is pre-
sented with a several month old check, is unable to reach its cus-
12. American Defense Society v. Sherman National Bank of New York, 225
N.Y. 506, 122 N.E. 695 (1919), and Note, 45 YALE L.J. 1134 (1936). See also
2 N.Y. LAw REv. CoMM'N REP. 1467 (1955), and Comment, 20 U. Cm. L. REv.
667 (1953).
13. LA. R. S. 6:42 (1950); N.J. STAT. ANN. 17:9 A-225(B) (4) (1953)
(N.J. Statute replaced by Uniform Commercial Code § 4-407, eff. Jan. 1, 1963).
14. The cases are collected in 3 PATON, DIGEST 3469 (1944), and Supp.
(1954) (Stopping Payment, § 7:1).
15. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-103(1).
16. HOGAN & PENNEY, N.Y. STATE SUPP. TO BANKS AND THE UNIFORM COM-
MERCIAL CODE 45 (N. Y. State Banker's Ass'n 1964).
17. LA. R. S. 6:52 (1950); UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-404.
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tomer, and is faced with the possibility of either a suit for
wrongful dishonor or a stale check claim. The Code provides
that a bank may refuse to pay a check which is more than six
months old, but it is protected in paying a check dated more
than six months earlier if it does so in "good faith." 18 The post-
six months clause was undoubtedly designed to permit banks to
pay checks as to which they could reasonably infer their cus-
tomers intent to pay, such as checks made payable to tax col-
lectors, insurance companies, and the like. The Louisiana stat-
ute protects banks for refusal to pay checks dated a year or
more before presentment, unless the bank receives express in-
structions to pay.19 There is no provision affecting the bank's
liability if it does choose to pay after the passage of a year and
I was able to find no Louisiana cases charging banks for the
payment of "stale" checks. 20 A six-month period seems more
realistic for checks than a year. Certainly no one would have
cause to object to a halving of the one-year time period in Lou-
isiana if given the Code's escape clause for good faith payments.
F. Payment of Checks After Death or Incompetence
of Customer (4-405)
There appear to be neither cases nor statutes in Louisiana
on the question of a bank's duty or right to pay checks after
the customer's death. The Code codifies what appears to be the
majority rule protecting banks in paying checks until they learn
of their customer's death2' and adds a provision, comparable
to some state statutes,2 2 permitting a bank to pay even after
learning of the customer's death if they do so within a ten-day
period measured from the day of the customer's death.2
G. Duty to Examine Returned Vouchers (4-406)
The Code, in subsection 4-406(1), imposes an affirmative
duty on the customer to discover and report unauthorized sig-
18. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-404.
19. LA. R. S. 6:52 (1950).
20. The only related case concludes that a check is not "overdue" when bought
six days after its date of issuance. Hammond State Bank v. Perrin & Pierrepont,
1 La. App. 108 (Orl. Cir. 1924).
21. Glennan v. Rochester Trust & Safe Deposit Co., 209 N.Y. 12, 102 N.E.
537 (1913) ; 1 PATON, DIGEST 1079-81 (1944).
22. See the statutes collected by Leary, Some Clarifications in the Law of
Commercial Paper under the Proposed Uniform Commercial Code, 97 U. PA. L.
REv. 354, 369-70 (1949).
23. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-405 (2).
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natures and alterations. A failure to examine and report such
irregularities relieves the bank as to items bearing forged sig-
natures or alterations. Until he notifies the bank, the customer
who does not exercise reasonable care and promptness is also
precluded from asserting unauthorized signatures or alterations
by the same wrongdoer on items paid by the payor bank, if the
first item and statement were available to that customer for
a reasonable period, not exceeding fourteen calendar days.24 The
Code adds a provision barring any action against a bank for
claims arising from alterations or forgeries of the drawer's sig-
nature after one year and barring actions based on forged and
unauthorized indorsements after three years.25
The Code differs from the comparable Louisiana statutes in
several respects: (1) The Code provisions relate to "items,"
a broader term than "checks" as treated in the Louisiana stat-
ute26 concerning forged or raised checks, etc. (2) The Code
includes any alterations, not mere "raising. ' 2 7  (3) The Code
provides a statute of limitation for forged indorsements (three
years) where there is no such provision under Louisiana law.
(4) Whereas the Code provision imposing the affirmative duty
to examine vouchers relates solely to discovery of forgeries and
alterations, the Louisiana statute requires examination for and
report of "any errors," a somewhat broader responsibility. (5)
Although the Louisiana statute has no fourteen-day time period
comparable to the provision in section 4-406 (2) (b), it does seem
to bar customer claims as to later checks forged or altered by
the same wrongdoer. There is decisional law in Louisiana and
several other jurisdictions in accord with this latter rule.28
The limitation of the Code rule to losses caused by forgery
or alteration leaves a troublesome gap as to at least one type
of related problem. This may be illustrated by the recent case
of McKenzie & Mouk, Inc. v. Ouachita Nat'l Bank in Monroe.29
An insurance agency had maintained its checking account with
the defendant bank for ten years. Mrs. Snapp had the responsi-
bility for handling the agency's books of account and bank state-
24. Id. §4-406 (2) (b).
25. Id. § 4-406(4).
26. Compare UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-406 with LA. R. S. 6:53 (1950).
27. Ibid.
28. Israel v. State National Bank of New Orleans, 124 La. 885, 50 So. 783
(1909).
29. McKenzie & Mouk, Inc. v. Ouachita Nat'l Bank in Monroe, 159 So.2d 304
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1963), aff'd, 245 La. 732, 160 So. 2d 595 (1964).
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ments but she violated her trust by embezzling over twelve
thousand dollars from her employer in a great many small trans-
actions. She would make deposits with the bank listing and
totaling the checks and then add an entry reading "less cash"
for a small amount, usually under $50, which she received from
the cash tellers, telling them that this was cash needed for the
business. Although Mrs. Snapp's defalcations could have been
discovered by a proper audit at an earlier time, she was only
detected when a check on her books was made when she became
ill in October of 1960. The bank was notified on December 2,
1960, one day after Mrs. Snapp's death. The court held that
the insurance agency was in the best position to check the de-
posit slips and would therefore have to bear the loss. Although
not specifically covered, the result seems consistent with the
present Louisiana statute.30 A more recent Texas case,8 1 also
involving an embezzling employee's use of the "less cash" modus
operandi, was similarly decided in favor of the bank on the
ground that it was the duty of the depositor to examine his books
and statements and report any errors to the bank with "reason-
able promptness."
The Code provision requiring examination of statements and
items simply does not cover this situation. It may well be that
the present Louisiana statute doesn't cover it either, but it cer-
tainly presents many more hand-holds for its applicability than
the Code. However, if the Code were adopted and this kind of
case or another non-covered case arose, a gap-filling argument
for the bank could be made by invoking the Code's "supple-
mentary general principles of law" provision, to permit the rule
of the McKenzie case to be applied. It could certainly be argued
that there is a general obligation of a customer to examine and
reconcile its statements and perform the other routine and rea-
sonable bookkeeping procedures that would bring such defalca-
tions to light.
The Code does offer some sensible rules regulating the bank-
customer relationship and in the case of Louisiana these rules
do not represent a drastic upheaval. Although the Code is very
well adapted to the latest practices in the banking industry, the
industry is revolutionizing its practices so rapidly that the stat-
ute may soon become outdated.
30. See LA' R. S. 6:36 (1950).
31. First National Bank in Graham v. Fultz, 380 S.W. 2d 894 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1964).
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I would like to deal briefly with some of these developments.
Let me first summarize the essentials of electronic check han-
dling. At present, provision is made for the encoding of mag-
netic numerals in three separate "fields" or segments at the
bottom of a check. Two fields are normally pre-encoded at the
time of printing, one identifying the payor bank by transit num-
ber, the other identifying the customer with an arbitrary num-
ber assigned to his account. The third field is for the amount,
and ideally its encoding will occur at the time the first bank
with appropriate equipment receives it in the course of collec-
tion. When the system is fully operative, not only may payment
be enormously facilitated by the substitution of a computer for
rows of girls each with file drawers full of ledgers, but trans-
fers between banks will be greatly facilitated as well. Banks in
the chain of collection will automatically prove totals on batches
of checks, sort the items by destination, list them, total them,
prepare the so-called "cash letter," and record the bank's en-
dorsement. 32 This system produces some new problems such as
what to do about encoding errors; but let's go back to part 4
of article 4, and, in particular, to section 4-406 and the rule re-
quiring a customer to examine his statement and returned
checks.
At an ABA automation conference in March, a New York
banker suggested that banks discontinue the practice of return-
ing checks to their customers.33 He advocated the inclusion of
a fourth item of information in the magnetized symbols, namely,
the serial number of the customer's check. Magnetic serial num-
bers would be put on all checks at the time they are printed.
Customers would receive a periodic statement of paid checks
listed in the sequence in which he or she issued them rather than
having the paid and canceled checks returned to him with the
statement. The banker argued that it was time "to help a cus-
tomer locate an outstanding check, not by making him sort paid
checks, but by sending him a statement identifying each paid
check with its serial number and placing an asterisk at the
place where an outstanding check would have appeared had it
been paid." He mentioned that this was already being done for
many large corporate customers. Rather than returning the
32. CLARKE, BAILEY & YOUNG, BANK DEPOSITS AND CoLLEcnoNs 175 (1963).
33. Lawrence E. Davies, A bylined special to the N.Y. Times March 9, 1965
datelined San Francisco referring to a talk given by W. Putnam Livingstone,
Vice President of the Banker's Trust Company.
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checks the bank would keep them and have them available for
the customer upon request. Consider this suggestion in the light
of section 4-406. There would obviously be no opportunity for
the customer to examine the items to discover alterations or
forgeries. The only alteration which the customer could detect
would be with respect to the amount. If a check were raised
it would be immediately discernible, since the customer would
be able to compare individual items with his check stubs, and
compare the bank's balance with his own. With this exception,
however, most of section 4-406 would be outdated. The bank
would continue to be liable for paying checks bearing forged
drawer's or indorser's signatures, or items otherwise not in
accord with the customer's instructions. Banks would have to
be prepared to absorb losses discoverable only by the customer's
examination of the checks themselves. It came as somewhat of a
shock to me recently to discover that many computerized banks
do not manually verify customer's signatures, and apparently
there has not yet been developed a sufficiently accurate elec-
tronic signature reader to do the job for them. This means that
many banks are gambling on the validity of their customer's
signatures, apparently prepared to absorb any losses on forged
items as the price for the increased efficiency in check handling
in the payment process. It also means that if the New York
banker's suggestion on returning checks is pursued, many checks
will never again be touched by human hands or seen by human
eyes once they are fed into the maws of electronic check-handling
equipment.
There is a secondary effect on the increased reliance on mag-
netic markings. It argues for putting a duty of care upon the
customer to safeguard his pre-encoded checks. If he is careless
with them but seeks to impose liability upon his bank for fail-
ing to heed his instructions, the bank ought to, and probably will,
be able to defeat the customer's claim.
34
There are other areas in which electronic check-handling
practices have produced and will produce legal problems not
covered by article 4. John Clarke of the Federal Reserve Bank
of New York has been responsible for several articles and talks
on the problems of formulating rules for allocating encoding
34. See Fried, Some Legal Implications of the Use of Computers in the Bank-
sp Business, 81 BANKING L.J. 753, 762 (1964).
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error losses. 5 The most straightforward suggestion is to place
the loss upon the bank that encoded the check with the amount
varying from the figure inscribed by the customer. Other prob-
lems have to do with check certifications and stop payments
which have long been thorns in the flesh of the banking indus-
try. Electronic check handling has only served to accentuate
bankers' difficulties with respect to these services and increase
the vociferousness of the bankers in their arguments for their
abandonment.
Check certifications present an increased hazard because of
the relative ease with which a double debit to a customer's ac-
count may occur through human or mechanical error in failing
to appropriately signal the computer not to debit the customer's
account a second time when the check is processed for payment.
The bank may suffer wrongful dishonor liability when its cus-
tomer's account is reduced by twice the amount of the certified
check and subsequent checks are "bounced." 36
Stop payments present technical problems similar to certi-
fication with a variation in that here, along with the risks of
human errors made by bank personnel, there are additional
headaches in precisely identifying the check to be stopped. An
error of one cent or the transposition of figures in any of the
digits in the amount column may result in the bank's failure to
pick up the stopped item with its automatic equipment. Although
many of these banks would undoubtedly escape liability to their
customers for violating stop payment orders, the substantial pos-
sibilities for error with resultant damage to customer relations
cause bankers many sleepless nights. Where the loss is caused
by human error of a bank employee or by malfunction of the
automated system, the banks are not able to avoid liability
with the use of exculpation clauses. If the bankers' battle to
discontinue or curtail stop payment privileges is won, sections
4-103, 4-403, and 4-407 will require re-examination.
Let me mention two more lines of development that may
leave the Code far behind. First, remote electronic present-
ment through the Federal Reserve Banks is now being seriously
discussed. Rather than ship so-called transit items all over the
country for collection, they would be fed into an electronic reader
35. See CLARK, BAILEY & YOUNG, BANK DEPOSITS AND COLLECTIONS 174,
and articles cited 174, n.1 (1963).
36. See Windsor, The Certified Check, A Special Handling Item in Automa-
tion, 81 BANKING L.J. 480 (1964).
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at the Federal Reserve Bank serving the bank which takes the
item for collection. This reader would be connected to other
federal reserve banks all over the country, which in turn would
have connections to all computerized payor banks in their re-
spective districts. The "payment" would be made electronically
at that time with a debit to the taped customer's account in the
payor's computer. The checks might be sent along later, but
much of the banking industry's preoccupation with the "float,"
that is, the amount outstanding on uncollected checks at any one
time, would be rendered moot. There is even some discussion
about pushing back the reading process to the first bank taker
that has a line into the national network connecting the com-
puters. Also under discussion is the possibility of not shipping
the checks to the payor bank at all, but rather storing them at
a place where they are electronically read and then destroying
them after an appropriate time period has elapsed. Down the
drain would go the commercial bank's arguments for the use of
checks in paying bills because of their value as receipts. Unless
signature-reading equipment is developed, we would also have
to give up many of our present rules tied to signature verifica-
tion. It could be argued, however, that signatures are not veri-
fied now in most computerized banks, so there would be nothing
lost on that score if remote electronic presentment were intro-
duced.
If remote electronic presentment strikes you as far removed
from reality, let me tell you about plans for doing away with
checks altogether in most transactions where checks are now
used. At the convention of the American Bankers Association
last October, the Bell Telephone Division of American Tele-
phone and Telegraph Company demonstrated equipment which
would permit people to pay their bills electronically, in seconds,
by telephone. Users of this service would be supplied with spe-
cial telephones with receiving slots in the back and pushbuttons
rather than a dial. By inserting a plastic dialing card, you are
connected to your bank's computer which signals that it is on
the line by emitting a special tone signal. You then insert your
personal checking account key card, which identifies you to the
computer. A third card is inserted to identify the creditor to
whom payment is to be made. You then press the appropriate
buttons to indicate the amount.' If your creditor maintains his
account with the same bank, an immediate debit and credit is
[Vol. XXVI
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accomplished with the preparation of an appropriate advice of
credit.
. This same device can be used at the supermarket in lieu of
cashing a check to pay for your groceries. The cash-out clerk
merely takes your cards, puts them into her equipment and
accomplishes a direct debit to your account and credit to her
employer. As in the case of electronic presentment, the scheme
contemplates that ultimately all the bank computers would be
linked so that any bill could be paid if the creditor maintains
his account in any computerized and linked bank.
Needless to say, all of these changes are not going to come
about tomorrow. However, I assure you that some of these "pipe-
dreams" will materialize so quickly that you and I will witness,
and perhaps participate in, a complete redrafting of the whole
body of law controlling bank collections and the bank-customer
relationship.
ARTICLE 8 - INVESTMENT SECURITIES
Article 8 of the Uniform Commercial Code is often described
as the negotiable instruments law of investment securities. It
would replace the Uniform Stock Transfer Act which has been
in effect in Louisiana since 1911. It would also replace the Uni-
form Act for Simplification of Fiduciary Security Transfers en-
acted in Louisiana in 1960, since part 4 of article 8, setting forth
the rules with respect to an issuer's or transfer agent's duty to
register transfers was drafted to incorporate all the elements of
the Simplification Act. The major departure made by the drafts-
men of the Code was to alter the terminology involved so as to
achieve conformity throughout the Code. Article 8, however,
does not deal with "Blue Sky Law" problems or the regulation
of the internal affairs of corporations.
This article contains four parts. Part I sets forth definitions
and rules of general application. Of special importance is the
functional definition of the term "security," determining what
types of instruments are controlled. Section 8-102 defines a "se-
curity" as an instrument which (1) is issued in bearer or regis-
tered form; (2) is of a type commonly dealt in upon securities
exchanges or markets, etc.; (3) is one of a class or series, etc.;
and (4) evidences an interest in an enterprise or an obligation
of the issuer. Article 8 extends full negotiability to all such
securities.
1966]
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Article 8 deals separately with the problem of cutting off
defenses of an issuer of a security as against a purchaser for
value and without notice, and the problem of competing rights
or claims of successive holders or claimants to securities in the
case of sales and transfers. The former is dealt with in part 2
and the latter in part 3.
There are two major problems of practical significance to
those who are not stock transfer specialists, and it is to these
problems that I wish to address myself. The first concerns
levying upon or attaching stock certificates, and the second deals
with the issuance of replacement securities for those lost, de-
stroyed, or stolen.
Perhaps a helpful way to discuss these problems is to con-
sider a series of hypothetical fact situations. Let us begin with
the least difficult problem- the lost, destroyed, or stolen stock
certificate.
If a stock certificate of a Louisiana corporation owned by
a Louisiana resident is lost or destroyed, the Uniform Stock
Transfer Act, as enacted in Louisiana, would apply, as the act
contains a specific provision on this subject.37 In many in-
stances the corporation's by-laws also provide for such contin-
gencies so that if a stockholder is able to satisfy the corpora-
tion's agents that he is the true owner, has lost his certificate,
and is willing to post an indemnity bond, a replacement certifi-
cate will be issued. If the corporation refuses, the Stock Trans-
fer Act provides for bringing an action to compel issuance with
the requirement that reasonable notice be given, by publication
or otherwise, to interested persons. The statute also provides
for the giving of a bond approved by the court, and for the
payment of the corporation's reasonable costs and counsel fees.8s
Now let us assume that the lost stock certificate was issued
to our Louisiana resident by a corporation organized under the
laws of New York or some other jurisdiction which has adopted
the Uniform Commercial Code. Even though the certificate was
lost in Louisiana by a Louisiana owner, New York rather than
Louisiana law would most likely be applied to determine the
responsibility of the corporation to issue a replacement secu-
37. LA. R.S. 12:540 (1950).
38. Ibid.
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rity.39 The Code imposes the duty of issuing a substitute cer-
tificate upon the issuer-corporation, when certain statutory re-
quirements are met,40 and although no judicial remedy is pro-
vided for in the Code, it seems quite apparent that a proceed-
ing compelling a corporation to issue such a certificate would
be available upon the fulfillment of these requirements.
The Code adds several requirements not found in the previous
statute. As a pre-condition to his right of receiving a replace-
ment security, the owner must notify the issuer within a rea-
sonable time after discovery that the security has been lost, de-
stroyed, or stolen. This must be done before the issuer has reg-
istered a transfer of the security. Then if the owner makes a
request for the issuance of a substitute security, before the is-
suer is notified that the lost or stolen security has been acquired
by a bona fide purchaser, the issuer must comply once the owner
files a sufficient indemnity bond and satisfies any other reason-
able requirements. The Code's provision is self-executing and
mandatory, as contrasted with the Stock Transfer Act provision
for recourse to a court in which discretion is vested to determine
whether a new certificate shall issue. The Code also provides
that should a bona fide purchaser turn up with the lost security
after a new security has been issued to the true owner, the cor-
poration must issue a properly registered certificate to the bona
fide purchaser unless such action would result in an over-issue.
The issuer may then have recourse to the indemnity bond posted
by the true owner, this having been the principal reason behind
the requirement of the bond. In the alternative, the Code per-
mits the issuer to recover the new or substitute security given
to the alleged true owner unless such security has also found its
way into the hands of a bona-fide purchaser. If the indemnity
bond is utilized, the duplicate security must, of course, be left
outstanding.
Aside from the additional hurdles required for the issuance
of duplicate certificates, the Code differs from the Uniform
Stock Transfer Act in its specific coverage of the stolen security
situation. New York was one of the few states to interpret the
act to cover stolen as well as lost or destroyed securities. 41 Al-
39. Comment, Conflict of Laws in Louisiana: Contract, 38 TUL. L. Rav. 726
(1964).
40. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 8-405.
41. National Sur. Co. v. Indemnity Ins. Co. of North America, 237 App. Div.
485, 261 N.Y.Supp. 605 (lst Dept. 1933).
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though the courts of Louisiana have apparently not dealt
squarely with stolen securities, they have interpreted the act
to cover securities wrongfully withheld. 42
If a New York corporation were doing business in Louisiana
so as to be subject to service, consideration would undoubtedly
be given to bringing an action here to compel the issuance of a
duplicate certificate even though Louisiana courts would un-
doubtedly apply New York law. Although Mr. Francis T.
Christy, the stock transfer expert, indicates that an action to
compel a foreign corporation to replace a lost stock certificate
may be maintained, 43 bringing such an action is not always free
from doubt and difficulty. For example, the New York courts
declined to entertain jurisdiction in an action involving New
Jersey shares because of the provision in the Uniform Stock
Transfer Act which requires consistency between the law of the
forum and the law of the corporate domicile, for the application
of its provisions.44 Although there is a great deal of similarity
between the Uniform Stock Transfer Act and the Uniform Com-
mercial Code, there seems to be ample opportunity to find in-
consistency if a Louisiana judge were disinclined to accept juris-
diction. Earlier decisions denied any applicability of the lost
securities section to foreign corporations.45
Where the issuing corporation is not doing business in Lou-
isiana, the Louisiana stockholder would be forced to seek re-
course in the courts of the jurisdiction of corporate domicile
with all the additional expense and problems which going out
of one's state imply. Where such a jurisdiction had adopted the
Uniform Commercial Code, however, there is less likelihood of
even having to seek judicial relief because of the Code's more
elaborate and clear cut provisions, and the mandatory, self-
executing character of the lost securities section.
The problem of levy or attachment is often more complex.
Both the Uniform Stock Transfer Act and the Uniform Com-
mercial Code look to the stock certificate itself as a property
interest subject to attachment or levy, rather than an intangible
claim against the corporation with its situs at the domicile of
42. Dyer v. Bridge Heights Realty Co., 170 La. 1092, 129 So. 647 (1930).
43. CHRISTY, TRANSFER OF STOCK 25:5 (3d ed. 1964) ; Guilford v. Western
Union Tel. Co., 59 Minn. 332, 61 N.W. 324 (1894).
44. Application of Hughes, 2 Misc.2d 122, 150 N.Y.S.2d 717 (Sup. Ct. 1956).
45. In re Bernhard, 209 App. Div. 808, 205 N.Y.S. 195 (1st Dep't 1924);
Application of Ostrander, 206 App. )iv. 362, 201 N.Y.S. 423 (1st Dep't 1923).
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the corporation. This approach bears out the dominant purpose
of both statutes - to give full negotiability to stock certificates.
Stock certificates are usually held in safe-keeping or otherwise
out of reach of levying or attaching creditors. In most instances,
creditors have no idea where a debtor's certificates are kept.
The Uniform Stock Transfer Act sought to meet this problem
by providing an alternative to actual seizure of the certificate.
Levy or attachment can be accomplished under present Louisi-
ana law as to Louisiana stock by obtaining personal jurisdiction
over the holder of the certificate and enjoining him from fur-
ther transfer. 46 Notwithstanding the injunction, however, the
holder may transfer the certificate to a bona fide purchaser for
value. If, for example, a sheriff conducts a sale and delivers an
assignment to his purchaser, the corporation is on the proverbial
horns of a dilemma. If the bona fide purchaser is not recognized,
the negotiable character of the security is denied. If the pur-
chaser from the sheriff is not able to demand a stock certificate
in his name, the levy by injunction device is meaningless. Uni-
form Stock Transfer Act jurisdictions have worked out varying
solutions to this dilemma.
Although the courts of Louisiana do not seem to have passed
upon this question since the adoption of the Uniform Stock
Transfer Act, an earlier case held that a creditor could not
attach bank stock standing in the name of the debtor by service
of garnishment process on the issuing bank where the stock
certificate representing the debtor's interest had been duly and
earlier assigned by him.47 If levy or attachment on shares of
stock in a Louisiana corporation were now to be made, the courts
would undoubtedly entertain an injunction proceeding as one
avenue for the accomplishment of such an objective.
As in the case of lost shares, a different problem would be
presented if shares of stock of a New York corporation, owned
by a Louisiana debtor, were the subject of an attachment or
levy. Suppose for example that a Louisiana resident is seeking
to levy on shares of IBM stock held by and in the name of his
New Orleans debtor, IBM being both a very popular stock and
the stock of a New York corporation. Although under Louisiana
law the situs of the property interest is the situs of the certifi-
46. LA. R.S. 12:536 (1950).
47. Kern v. Day, 45 La. Ann. 71, 12 So. 6 (1893). See generally, Johnson,
Attachment and Sequestration: Provisional Remedies under the Louisiana Code
of Civil Procedure, 38 TUL. L. REV. 1 (1963).
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cate,48 the Uniform Stock Transfer Act contains language which
some courts have construed as making the attachment provi-
sions applicable only where the situs of the domicile of the cor-
poration issuing the shares has "laws consistent with this sub-
chapter." 49 In Pennsylvania, for example, it has been held that
no attachment proceeding is available against Delaware stock
certificates physically present in Pennsylvania because of cer-
tain inconsistencies between the stock transfer acts of the two
states.50 The particular stumbling block with respect to Dela-
ware stocks has been created by the Delaware provision that:
"For all purposes of title, action, attachment, garnishment
and jurisdiction of all courts held in this State, but not for
the purpose of taxation, the situs of the ownership of the
capital stock of all corporations existing under the laws of
this State, whether organized under this chapter or other-
wise, shall be regarded as in this State."51
There is no reported Louisiana case determining whether
Louisiana's levy and attachment provisions can be applied to
shares of stock issued under the laws of another state. Professor
Vern Countryman has indicated that the adoption of the Uni-
form Commercial Code by jurisdictions such as Louisiana would
alleviate this problem, because the language of the Code 52 is
"not apt to incorporate the law of the state of incorporation
as the 'situs' of the security." 5 However, the one decision on this
question, by the courts of a Code jurisdiction, contradicts him.5
It seems more than likely that even lawyers in Code states
will continue to have difficulty attaching Delaware shares until
that state repeals its statute which gives controlling effect to
its laws as to all matters relating to interests in stock issued by
Delaware corporations. 55 Even if some Code states are willing
to apply the Code's attachment and levy provisions to Delaware
shares, however, it is doubtful whether a later proceeding to
48. LA. R.S. 12:536 (1950).
49. Id. 12:521(A), (B).
50. Mills v. Jacobs, 333 Pa. 231, 4 A.2d 152 (1939).
51. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 169 (1953).
52. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 8-196.
53. COUNTRYMAN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON DEBTOR AND CREDITOR, 39, n.18
(1964).
54. Vant v. Gish, Jr., 111 Pittsb. Leg. J. 265, 1 UCC Reporting Service 339
(Ct. Com. Pleas 1963).
55. DEz. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 169 (1953).
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compel transfer of the shares in Delaware or elsewhere will be
successful. 56
Paradoxically, there are a few cases in which it is to the
distinct advantage of attaching creditors to have the laws of
Delaware apply. Suppose for example that a judgment debtor
has a substantial number of shares of a Delaware corporation,
and of course, it is relevant to note that many of the most
popular stocks are of Delaware corporations.57 Suppose further
that these Delaware shares are the only substantial assets that
you know about, but they are held for the debtor in a broker's
margin trading account. If the brokerage house has offices in
New York, New Orleans, and other cities, it is more than likely
that the "street name" shares in which the debtor has an inter-
est will be physically located in the New York office so as to
be near the exchange. Therefore, if you represent a Louisiana
creditor you are faced with both a conflict of laws and a "street
name" share problem. There are several possibilities. First of
all, the brokerage firm may be regarded as the "holder" of
the securities.," You might therefore attempt to invoke the Uni-
form Stock Transfer Act provision permitting attachment or
levy by an injunction against the holder, but it is not at all clear
that a Louisiana injunction against a local office of the broker-
age firm will be effective as to shares held by the main office
in New York City.!5 9 Attachment or levy might be concurrently
attempted in New York under UCC section 8-317. Although the
Code requires seizure of the certificates, a separate subparagraph
of the Code's attachment provision provides for legal and equi-
table relief to assist in satisfying claims and reaching securities
that are difficult to attach. Such relief would appear to include
garnishment of the debtor's interest in securities held for him
by the broker.60 A case decided in New York prior to the Code's
adoption permitted sequestration of the debtor's "equity" in
56. Welland Investment Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank of Jersey City, 81 N.J.
Super. 180, 195 A. 2d 210 (1963).
57. See CCI, Stock Transfer Guide, CORPORATION DIRECTORY (1965).
58. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-201(20).
59. Compare Bodes v. Hodes, 176 Ore. 102, 155 P.2d 564 (1945) (personal
jurisdiction over "Holder" in Oregon effective as to stock certificate kept in
Washington under Uniform Stock Transfer Act attachment 'by injunction provi-
sion), and United States v. First Nat'l City Bank, 379 U.S. 378 (1965), with
Nederlansche Handel-Maatschappij v. Sentry Corp., 163 F. Supp. 800 (E. D.
Pa. 1958) (no injunctive relief available under UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
§ 8-317, where personal services on holder but shares out of state).
60. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAws & RULES §§ 5222. See also Comment, Garniskmeat
in Loui$iana, 18 LA. L. REv. 446 (1958).
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securities subject to a margin account debt to the broker.6 1
Finally, and this is where Delaware law works to the creditor's
advantage insofar as the stocks held for the debtor are issued
by a Delaware corporation, a quasi in rem action may be
brought in Delaware, making the attachment by service on the
appropriate corporate officer in Delaware without regard to the
location of the certificates. If the value of the claim and the
Delaware securities are sufficiently great, it may be worthwhile
to pursue this avenue concurrently since Delaware does adhere
to the common law method of initiating attachment proceedings
as to corporate stock.62 Furthermore, Delaware is one of the
few jurisdictions having decisional law permitting attachment
of shares held in the name of a broker's nominee.6
Most Code provisions will be familiar to anyone who has had
experience under the Uniform Stock Transfer Act. As has been
said in many other discussions of the Code, however, the drafts-
man's elimination of several of the old perplexities has not solved
all the problems. Although article 8 is undoubtedly a major ad-
vance, there are still sufficient doubts to be stilled particularly
where conflict of laws questions are superimposed. There is
solace, however, in the fact that although the Code does not
solve all our problems, neither does it add to them. I hope that
no one will take it amiss when I say that one large element of
doubt will be removed when Delaware is persuaded to rejoin
the Union.
61. Hornblower & Weeks v. Sherwood, 124 N.Y.S. 2d 322 (Sup. Ct. 1953).
62. Note, Attachment of Corporate Stock: The Conflicting Approaches of Dela-
ware and the Uniform Stock Transfer Act, 73 IARV. L. REv. 1579 (1960).
63. Greene v. Johnston, 34 Del. Ch. 115, 99 A.2d 627 (Sup. Ct. 1953), cited
in HENN, CoRPoRA oNs 581 (1961).
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